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BOOK REVIEW ESSAY
RALPH GAEBLERe
The Death Penalty: Abolition in Europe. Edited by Tanja KLEINSORGE and
Barbara ZATLOKAL. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1999. Pp. 185.
US$30.00.
In 1998 no executions were carried out in any of the then 40 member
states of the Council of Europe. This moratorium was achieved in part
because of legal developments within the Council. In particular, one may
point to the 1985 entry into force of Protocol No. 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, which directly abolishes the death penalty in
those countries that ratify the Protocol. Perhaps even more important was the
decision taken by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in
1994 to require ratification of Protocol No. 6 by all future applicants for
membership in the Council. These developments, as well as either dejure or
defacto abolition of the death penalty by many member states on their own
initiative, implement a broad consensus that has been emerging in western
Europe for some time.
To celebrate this milestone the Council of Europe published this essay
collection in May, 1999. Like many collections The Death Penalty: Abolition
in Europe suffers from a number of minor, congenital defects, such as
redundancy and unevenness. Many of the essays are more journalistic than
scholarly; most lack adequate footnotes, which will be an annoyance to those
seeking citations to the more obscure documents discussed. More important,
the collection fails to cover certain topics that would have complemented the
material that is included. For example, many of the contributions allude to
the "fact" that the deterrence argument in favor of capital punishment has
been entirely discredited, without actually providing any support for this
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claim.I Therefore, a chapter summarizing the literature on this question
would have been welcome, and presumably would have strengthened the other
contributions. Another, minor fault worth note is the poor quality of
translation. Phrases frequently used, such as "execution of the death penalty"
(meaning 'use of the death penalty'), require a good bit of deciphering before
making sense, and some sentences fail to yield any sense at all, even upon
multiple re-readings. Finally, there are a few factual gaffes, such as a
reference to "His Holiness Jean Paul XXIII."
Despite problems of this sort, The Death Penalty: Abolition in Europe
offers a number of thought-provoking chapters, as well as certain overarching
themes. There are 13 short chapters in all (including the introduction and
conclusion), which fall into several categorical types. Four of the chapters
recount the chronology of legal events leading to the current state of affairs
in Europe.2 Another four chapters discuss the historical path towards
abolition and the current situation in particular countries.3 The remaining
articles deal in some way with arguments for and against the death penalty,
or with strategic concerns of the abolition movement.' As one might
imagine, assessment of the situation in the United States looms large in these
1 Several authors do make anecdotal references. For example, Renate Wohlwend
notes that the homicide rate in Canada fell after abolition of the death penalty in 1976,
while the rate rose in the United States after resumption of capital punishment in 1977
(p. 58). However, without placing these figures in the context of a more
comprehensive and systematic study, Wohlwend fails to persuade. Based on the facts
she presents, it is certainly possible that the homicide rate would have fallen in
Canada even faster if the death penalty had not been abolished, and conversely, that
it would have risen even faster in the United States without the resumption of capital
punishment.
2 These include "The Efforts of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe" by Renate Wohlwend; "Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on
Human Rights" by Hans Christian Krdger; "The Death Penalty and the Case-law of
the Institutions of the European Convention on Human Rights" by Caroline Ravaud
and Stefan Trechsel; and "The United Nations and the Abolition of the Death Penalty"
by Roberto Toscano.
3 These include "The Abolition of the Death Penalty in France" by Michel Forst;
"The Death Penalty in Slovakia" by Robert Fico; "A Vast Place of Execution: The
Death Penalty in Russia" by Anatoly Pristavkin; and "Abolishing the Death Penalty
in Ukraine: Difficulties Real or Imagined?" by Serhiy Holovatiy.
" These include "The Death Penalty Versus Human Rights" by Eric Prokosch;
"The Death Penalty and the 'Fairy Ring"' by Philippe Toussaint; "Victims of Crime
and the Death Penalty by Peter Hodgkinson; as well as the introduction by Roger
Hood, and the conclusion by Sergei Kovalev.
20001
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION
essays. Of course, there is some overlap between the categories outlined
here. For example, Robert Toscano's contribution on the role of the United
Nations summarizes the arguments against abolition of the death penalty that
have been raised in the context of international law.
One of the interesting themes to emerge from the collection is a
persistent worry about the relationship between the abolition movement and
democratic decision-making. Several of the authors note that public opinion
surveys, even in western Europe, continue to show that a majority of
respondents favor retention of the death penalty. Their response is to view
this democratic deficit as the result of insufficient public education on the
issue. As Michel Forst states:
If the opinion polls are to be believed, after more than twenty
years without an execution, the majority of the French public
are still not convinced. Yet is this a well-informed opinion,
is there a thorough understanding of the facts and the risks
involved in the death penalty? Finally, what value and
significance should be given to opinion polls?
Sergei Kovalev agrees with Forst that abolition of the death penalty
must proceed rapidly, despite the fact that it runs "counter to the will of the
majority," but he also finds a way to reconcile this goal with the demands of
liberal democracy. He makes the interesting argument that surveys of opinion
on individual issues are not as important as the fact that the public clearly
accepts a "system of values" that has been "package[d]" in western Europe
to include "freedom, democracy, and human rights." Hans Christian Krflger
states this even more assertively, in claiming that the death penalty is
incompatible with the "choices of a civilised, democratic society." According
to this view, abolition and democratic decision-making are not only
compatible, but complementary, despite the evidence of opinion polls.
Wondering who packaged western European liberalism, and why commitment
to human rights necessarily implies abolition of the death penalty, one might
be more than a bit skeptical that these authors are truly committed to
democratic decision-making, at least when it comes to the issue of abolition.
Better to state forthrightly their belief that abolition of the death penalty
embodies a moral imperative too important to be left to the vagaries of
democratic political institutions. To admit as much obviously does not
undermine their commitment to democracy altogether.
Another issue running through the entire collection is whether it is
appropriate at this point to require newly democratic nations to ratify Protocol
No. 6 in order to obtain admission to the Council of Europe. As a member
[Vol. 28:3
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of the Parliamentary Assembly, Renate Wohlwend considers this to be
perhaps the single most important step taken to date. On the other hand, in
his report on the situation in Slovakia, Robert Fico warns that there is now
a dangerous gap between official policy and public opinion. Caroline Ravaud
and Stefan Trechsel agree that it is "premature and unrealistic" to require
ratification by countries making the transition to democracy. And in their
eye-opening chapters on the current situation in Russia and Ukraine, Anatoly
Pristavkin and Serhiy Holovatiy make it very clear just how far attitudes must
change in those countries before abolition can possibly become a practical
goal. Indeed, Holovatiy states flatly that "executions in Ukraine continue
unabated and with seemingly renewed vigour," thus debunking the very fact
this book was published to celebrate. Undoubtedly the catastrophic rise of
organized crime in eastern Europe has cooled the ardor there for the
particular "package deal" on offer in western Europe.
The issue of whether to insist that eastern European countries join the
Council of Europe on the same terms adhered to by western European nations
is closely related to the general issue of whether abolition can proceed without
popular support. If the reports on the current situation in eastern Europe are
to be believed, it is clear that legal developments have dangerously outpaced
the social situation there. Where legal norm and social reality diverge so
clearly, one wonders whether insistence on ratification of Protocol No. 6
might not undermine legitimate, but fragile regimes, as well as the rule of law
in general.
Several of the chapters in this book merit special mention for their
particularly thought-provoking arguments. In his very fine essay on "Victims
of Crime and the Death Penalty," Peter Hodgkinson argues that abolition of
the death penalty cannot be achieved at the expense of victims, but that the
abolition movement has in fact failed to take crime victims into account. This
failure has contributed to the rise of.an overtly political victims' rights
movement, devoted to retention of the death penalty, as well as to procedural
"rights," such as the right to provide "victim impact statements." In
Hodgkinson's view, rights-based advocacy often ignores the real needs of
victims, as in the questionable policy of permitting them to be present at
executions. One might add that advocacy of this type personalizes retribution
in a way that runs counter to the idea that criminal law is designed to protect
the public's interest, and ought not to be put at any individual's service.
The particular merit of Hodgkinson's essay is to offer an alternative
model of victim support focused squarely on the practical and emotional needs
of victims and those close to them. Victim support along these lines avoids
political entanglement in the criminal justice system because it is not focused
on penal reform. For Hodgkinson, it is important that this model of victim
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support is compatible with abolitionism. However, regardless of one's views
on abolition of the death penalty, this model will be especially interesting to
American readers because it offers an attractive vision of victim support quite
alien to our experience.
Another particularly interesting essay is the conclusion by Sergei
Kovalev, who attempts to understand the true nature of the disagreement
between the so-called abolitionists and retentionists. Surprisingly, Kovalev
locates the source of disagreement in political history. According to his view,
political objections to the death penalty arose in a two-stage process. First,
with the rise of powerful states, government appropriated to itself a monopoly
on revenge. Then, in the Enlightenment, deification of the state was replaced
by a democratic conception of public authority, which emphasized the threat
it poses to individual freedom. Then "[i]t took the tragic experience of the
French Revolution.. .to make us realise that any 'absolute' abstraction that puts
itself above the individual and his rights invariably degenerates into a form
of legalised despotism." In other words, there is in liberal democracy an
inherent objection to the ultimate control by any public agency of "human
destinies."
Although clearly aimed at totalitarian states, this argument is
intriguing because it suggests a quite plausible explanation for the wide gulf
between western Europe and the United States on the issue of the death
penalty. Having been forged in a far different revolutionary experience, the
United States has much less reason to fear the totalitarian excesses of
ideology. With less fear of public authority, Americans are perhaps less
concerned about the ultimate control of human destiny that the death penalty
represents. This explanation for the gulf between western Europe and the
United States is made even more fascinating by the fact that it turns on its
head the usual characterization of Europe as government-friendly and the
United States as hostile to government.
Whatever one might think of Kovalev's argument, one must admire
his honest effort to understand the retentionist view. With this sole exception,
The Death Penalty: Abolition in Europe lacks any hint that it understands, or
even respects, the complexity of the retentionist position. This is perhaps
inevitable in a book that is polemical in nature, but nonetheless regrettable.
As a result, the book is unlikely to live up to the promise in the
accompanying brochure that it will be "invaluable for our campaign against
the death penalty in the United States." Equally disappointing is the loss of
what could have been a very engaging philosophical discussion. The potential
reader will have to look elsewhere for that.
[Vol. 28:3'
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Perhaps most irksome is the book's persistent, obtuse caricature of the
just retribution argument as primitive, unenlightened, primordial, etc.'
Whether or not one agrees that application of the death penalty is ever
justified, one ought to recognize that the just retribution argument embodies
a very profound belief about the nature of human evil and the best method of
confronting it. This belief amounts to a claim that human actors are
responsible for their own wicked acts and must therefore be held accountable.
Diametrically opposed to this is the view, succinctly expressed in a statement
quoted by Serhiy Holovatiy, that "society... is largely to blame for the crimes
committed in it, for it is the environment which fills the human will with evil
and criminal tendencies, and is the cause of crimes rather than an individual
evil will." In other words, the human will is naturally free of evil.
Recognizing the depth of disagreement here, I nevertheless find it
disappointing that no contributor to this volume was able to engage the just
retribution argument in a constructive fashion.
It is also worth noting that the contributors fail to understand, or at
least do not make clear, that the just retribution argument and the deterrence
argument are mutually exclusive. The former treats the actor as an end in
himself, justifying punishment exclusively in terms of the actor's desert, while
the latter justifies punishment exclusively in terms of its impact on subsequent
actors. Retentionists who defend the death penalty on the basis of the just
retribution principle ought to be horrified by an argument to impose the death
penalty (or any other penalty) on any basis other than the actor's merit.
Nevertheless, the contributors to this volume proceed as if they can discredit
retentionists in general by impugning either of these approaches.
Despite the book's lack of depth, and the less serious failings
mentioned earlier, The Death Penalty: Abolition in Europe can still be
recommended as a reasonable addition to research collections. By providing
a snapshot of the abolitionist movement in western Europe today, it furnishes
5 This misunderstanding is most clearly revealed in Peter Hodgkinson's statement
about the relationship between the retribution principle and the mode of execution
used. He states: "The mode of execution debate goes to the heart of the modem
purpose of the death penalty - retribution. The move towards the more sanitised and
clinical lethal injection represents an interesting dilemma; on the one hand it is an
attempt to make the execution process more civilised and therefore more acceptable,
whilst on the other it represents a dilution of the retributive justification." In other
words, retribution is equated with the infliction of pain. But the retribution principle
is completely indifferent to the level of pain; in fact, there is no inconsistency
between seeking retribution to redeem society's moral outrage, while at the same time
being concerned to do so in a.manner that is as painless as possible.
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a useful reminder of the depth of the cultural divide that persists between
Europe and the United States on the issue of capital punishment.
